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In The Supreme Court of The State of Utah

JOHN C. CRITCHLOW and
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS
CRITCHLOW, his wife; FUNNON T.
SHIMMIN and DONNA SHIMMIN,
his wife; and VERA SHIMMIN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13738

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
VERA SHIMMIN.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by appellants in August,
1973, following a partition suit between the Critchlow
brothers decided in September, 1971, whereby the
former court divided the Critchlow property into two
separate parcels of grazing lands and appellants Critchlow seek in this suit to establish a vehicular easement by
prescription over the lands of respondents Shimmin
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and as a consequence thereof to claim a way of necessity
over the partitioned lands of the respondents Critchlow.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The properties of the parties are grazing lands in a
mountainous area north of Price, Utah, which were
unsegregated by complete fencing between the Critchlow parts and Shimmin parts until the middle 1950's
(Tr. 229-230, 245). The respondent Vera Shimmin and
her husband, Foster Shimmin, who died in 1962,
bought their lands in 1935, while the Critchlows acquired their lands in parcels both before and after the
Shimmin acquisition (Tr 8-9, 233, 238, 258). For the last
40 years approximately, the cattle have had access in
late spring of each year to the grazing lands of the parties
by drifting up Deadman Canyon from the south and
have returned to the valley in late fall the same way. (Tr
226-227, 230-236, 247-248).
In 1971 the partition suit between John Critchlow
and Jay Critchlow divided the Critchlow lands into
separate parcels, as a result of which Jay Critchlow
trucks his cattle to his property from the north (red
property on Exhibit 1), and John Critchlow can drift his
cattle on and off the mountain on the south property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(marked green on Exhibit 1) the same as in years past (Tr
283-284).
The issue of the case arises because John Critchlow
claims the right of vehicular access over the Shimmin
property (marked in yellow on Exhibit 1) by prescriptive right to get to said green tract, whereas the cattle on
the green tract were serviced by Critchlows after the
fences were completed in 1953, until the partition suit
in 1971, by using the intermediate Mathis tract (marked
white on Exhibit 1) under an exchange agreement (Tr
66, 279-281).
The Complaint filed herein is entirely couched in
terms of demanding vehicular traffic over the Shimmin
roadway on the yellow tract together with a vehicle use
of necessity on the road over the red tract partitioned to
the respondent Jay Critchlow. The respondent Vera
Shimmin emphatically disagrees that since July, 1948, a
roadway has existed and been used by appellants over
the route contended for by appellants as stated on Page 5
of appellants brief. The record shows no evidence initiating a prescriptive user against the respondent Vera
Shimmin or against her deceased husband, owners of
the property since 1935, which would establish any
adverse, hostile, continuous, open, notorious or exclusive right of use by appellants over the Shimmin properDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ty. Said Complaint alleges in paragraph 20 thereof the
interruption of appellants' use of said alleged prescriptive easement by Shimmins on or about September 29,
1971. Any prescriptive right of use must be proven as to
the commencement, extent and duration in the record
against the owners of the lands for a full 20 year period.
No witness nor the appellants testified of an enforced
right of entry at any time nor of any circumstances
where the Shimmins would be put on notice that the
plaintiffs had commenced to earn a right by conquest or
adverse user for 20 years. The record is also absent any
showing by appellants that they could not operate their
green parcel for a cattle grazing operation in the historical manner on horseback without using any road from
the north over Shimmins property. Vera Shimmin testified she personally occupied said property for several
weeks each summer from 1935 to 1962 (when her husband died) riding horses all over the acreage, planting
grass and sowing seed from horseback, salting by horseback, marking calves ears, fixing fences, keeping house
in the cabins and riding horses up and down Deadman
Canyon, and she testified Critchlows had no reason to
come across the Shimmin property and she saw no one
using her property or roadway during those years (Tr
223-231). She further therein testified you couldn't
drive a car south of the first cabin inside the gate and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in 1953 and constantly since 1955 and replaced Gate 2
with a metal gate in the early 1960's; he prevented
Critchlows two or three times from coming through,
gave Critchlows permission to scatter salt as a
neighborly gesture, furnished all the locks after the first
one (broken off by Lynn Shimmin) and allowed Critchlows to buy a key at the airport when he changed locks
(Tr 250-281). Shimmins controlled their road through
the years as far as Critchlows were concerned and did
all of the work and paid all of the expense without
assistance in maintaining the roadway, even on the part
over the red parcel from the Park belonging to Critchlows (Tr 12, 253, 260-261).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT THE USE OF THE ROADWAY BY APPELLANTS WAS PERMISSIVE RATHER THAN PRESCRIPTIVE.
If the judge in the lower court found the facts for the
respondents under a conflict of evidence, the appellants
are quoting the law uselessly to apply to facts in the
record which obviously the judge disbelieved. The
parade of explorers and hunters offered as witnesses, as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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well as the appellants, that they motored on "the road"
for years before 1948 when Chidester's bulldozer
opened the road were undoubtedly not believed by the
trial judge. The testimony of those who built and maintained the road (Shimmins) after 1948 was apparently
believed by the trial judge. Finding No. 4 of the Findings
of Fact by the trial judge says in effect that * 'the use of the
roadway by the Plaintiffs over the property of the Defendants Shimmin at all times in the past has been
permissive and that said use has not at any time been
adverse, hostile, notorious or antagonistic to the rights
of the Defendants Shimmin. ,,

Even the alleged motor trip in 1936 by John Critchlow out to Section 31 to place salt was in the company of
Mr. Foster Shimmin over his property and it would
have to be assumed was by the permission of Mr.
Shimmin as owner (Tr 18). All of the witnesses of respondents testified it was impossible to get a motor
vehicle south of the rocks to Section 31 before 1948
when Chidester took his bulldozer out over the rim to
improve the cattle trail (Tr 279). What fact or incident
changed the user of John Critchlow from "permissive"
in the company of Foster Shimmin in 1936 to adverse?
The record is silent as to any adverse use by Critchlows
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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brought home to the owners and acquiesced in by them
for 20 years continuously and uninterruptedly.
25 American Jurisprudence 2nd 252-272 is a fine
article on the prescriptive right of way and it lists the
following requirements to establish prescription, towit:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.

Continuous
Uninterrupted
Open (not secret or hidden)
Notorious (known or visible to owner)
Adverse or hostile to owner
Use of definite right in land of another
Claim of right with connection to dominant
tenement
Exclusive right to use (not dependent on use
of others)
Invasion (^infringement on rights of owner
without license or permission of owner
Disregard for rights of owner
Assertion of rights of user to initiate period
of use
Acquiescence or knowledge of the servient
owner by passive assent, submission,
quiescence or consent by silence to adverse
and inconsistent user

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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M. For the required period (20 years in Utah)
All of the strict and extensive requirements must be
met to establish a prescriptive right of way and the
extent of the use acquired must be consistent for the
whole period and defined with certainty and definiteness. To countermand the finding of the lower court
trial judge would require that this record have no evidence of permissive use and that said use was uncontrovertibly adverse, hostile, notorious and antagonistic
to the rights of respondents Shimmin. Such is not this
record in this case.

Under the Statement of Facts it is clear that Shimmins did not complete their fences to divide off the
Critchlow lands until about 1953 or 1954. The road was
built in 1951 or 1952 to work on the fences. 25 American
Jurisprudence 2nd at page 457 states that where a way is
over uninclosed land, there is a presumption that the
use was permissive or at least that there is no presumption that the use was adverse. There certainly is no
positive evidence of adversity in the use before 1952.
When did the adverse use period of twenty (20) years
begin in this case? The Complaint alleges that respondents blocked the roadway to appellants on or about
September 29, 1971.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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25 Am. Jur. 2nd 453 states "Nor can one acquire title
by adverse user where his user is as a member of the
public, in common with all others exercising and enjoying the privilege of use, since the use in such a case is
not exclusive." The witnesses of appellants who were
joy-riders, hunters, neighbors or explorers who claimed
they went on the Shimmin roadway can contribute nothing to appellants. Neither does their evidence show
continuous usage nor to what extent their usage pertained to each year.
There were a number of interruptions after 1951 by
Shimmins to any pretended or claimed adverse use by
appellants, as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Breaking of Critchlows lock on Gate 2 by
Lynn Shimmin in 1952.
Blocking the road and keeping John Critchlow waiting to go with armed men in deerhunting party at the rocks in 1953 and asserting it was Shimmins' road.
Placing and replacing locks on gates by
Shimmins exclusively in 1953 and continuously thereafter.
Making Critchlows ask for keys to gain access through locked gates year after year
when locks were changed or replaced.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5.

Replace Gate 2 with a metal gate in 1960's.

6.

Attorney Luck Pappas' letter (Exhibit 17) in
1968 claiming right of way in appellant John
Critchlow over Shimmin lands and rejected
by Funnon Shimmin with reply that Critchlow use was without

right and

non-

negotiable, being permissive only.
7.

Alleged blocking of road by Shimmons on
September 29, 1971, causing this lawsuit.

If it is true that John Critchlow and Foster Shimmin
rode together in 1936 over the Shimmin property to
place salt out on the rim by Section 31, it must be
presumed without any other testimony that that incident was friendly, neighborly, permissive and by the
consent and license of the owner. There is not one word
in the record of a claim of right, adverse user or notice of
hostile exercise of continuous disregard of the rights of
Shimmins as owners of the property in question over
which a roadway or easement is claimed by appellants.
25 Am. Jur. 2nd 462 states the following:
"Use by express or implied permission or
license, no matter how long continued, cannot
ripen into an easement by prescription. Furthermore, if the original use by the claimant is by
permission, it is presumed to so continue.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Where the owner constructs a way over his
land for his own use and convenience, the
mere use thereof by others which in no way
interfers with his use will be presumed to be by
way of license or permission."
The appellants have failed to show by probative
evidence that a twenty year adverse period of user was
initiated, continued or completed. At least there is nothing to show that a claim of right to an easement against
Foster Shimmin and Vera Shimmin, as owners of the
lands up through 1962, had been open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive, hostile or without
permission and thereafter acquiesced in or submitted to
for a period of twenty years.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A WAY OF NECESSITY OVER THE
PROPERTY Of* RESPONDENTS CRITCHLOW.
T!*e properties partitioned to John Critchlow
(green) and Jay Critchlow (red) are not and never were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contiguous. The partition occurred by decision of three
referees and was "approved, allowed, settled and confirmed in every respect'' by Judge Ruggieri knowing
there was no established road from the north parcel to
the south parcel and that the acreages were unequal and
with limited access. No appeal was taken from the partition suit though there were motions for recondiseration
and for a new trial on the issues of access and who was
entitled to which parcel (Exhibits 18, 19, 20, and 21).
When the two parcels were owned in common by
the Critchlow brothers, they had access over the Mathis
property which separated the parcels by reason of an
exchange agreement with Rex Mathis. Because of the
partition, a court cannot grant a way of necessity over
the Mathis property nor over the Shimmin property.
Where the parcels are not contiguous, neither can the
court order a way of necessity over one of the separate
parcels. The appellants have not shown a necessity
exists for a way over the red parcel partitioned to Jay
Critchlow. Neither is this a proper case for a "way of
necessity/' 25 Am. Jur. 2nd 448-449 under Easements
reads as follows:
"A way of necessity is dependent on unity
of ownership of the dominant and servient estates, followed by a severance thereof. A way of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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necessity cannot be claimed over the land of a
third person, and it cannot exist where neither
the party claiming the way nor the owner of the
land over which it is claimed, nor anyone
under whom they or either of them claim, was
ever seised of both tracts of land at the same
time. Moreover, there must have been an absolute ownership of both tracts. A way of necessity does not arise, for example, where the
grantor owned merely anlindivided interest in
the land over which the right is claimed/'
At page 450 of 25 Am. Jur. 2nd, it is stated also that a
way of necessity must be more than a mere convenience
and probably be a strict or absolute necessity. It is obvious that unless a prescriptive right over the Shimmin
parcel can be established by the appellants, that a way
decreed to Appellants by the Court over the red parcel of
Jay Critchlow would be useless. The Complaint repeatedly complains that the plaintiffs (Appellants) are
denied vehicular access, but never is it alleged that they
have no access or are denied usual, reasonable or ordinary access. Vehicle access is a convenience, not a
necessity, to these particular grazing lands of appellants, especially when it is realized the use of the land
for cattle remains the same today as it has for over thirty
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years. You still round up cattle on hundreds of acres of
range land in mountainous areas on horseback or afoot.
Appellants have other avenues of ingress and egress or
to pursue building a rubber-tired access road up Deadman Canyon to their property if they desired to improve
their means of access (Tr 255-257, 212-219). Appellants
apparently have not sought a means of ingress and egress with the Mathis people to the west with whom they
previously exchanged use of property. Such alternatives might prove more costly than to demand a free
road and maintainance thereof from Shimmins.

POINT III
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENTS.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents
and against the appellants on the facts. Since there is no
right of way in favor of appellants, there could be no
damages for infringement of such right of way.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court had ample evidence that no prescriptive right of way had been proven by appellants
and that therefore no way of necessity existed nor were
there any damages.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN W. PAYNE
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent VERA SHIMMIN
128 East Center Street
P. O. Box 733
Provo, Utah 84601
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